In a published article by Royce Rowles of PGP Valuation Inc, Royce discusses the ratio between annual net income and sales prices.

“While the NOI may be falling at many properties (due to increased vacancy rates and/or more competitive rental rates), it almost certainly does not account for the entire value decline in this market. Major value declines also come from the changing status quo between buyers and sellers. Buyers have become much more patient and are expecting a much more favorable ratio between their NOI and purchase price. In other words, when there are fewer buyers (as often is the case in a down market) capitalization rates move upward. In situations where there are recent comparable sales, anyone valuing a property can easily extract and apply very current and realistic capitalization rates to estimate Market Value. This is because during times of appreciation, the market is usually active. Extracting supportable capitalization rates is easy. However, when transactions are scarce finding market capitalization rates can be significantly harder. When this happens, oftentimes sellers have an unrealistic opinion of value because they are relying on dated capitalization rate sources.”

So how do you extract capitalization rates, when transactions have been scarce? The following page discusses five ways to analyze capitalization rates.

National Surveys

According to the 2^nd Quarter 2009 National Investor Survey prepared by Korpacz, capitalization rates for self-storage facilities range from 7.00% to 10.00% with an average of 8.55%. Korpacz is just one of several national surveys providing important perspective relating to overall trends in the market. It’s important to not place too much emphasis on national surveys as there may be wide fluctuations in regional and local markets. However, a national survey is an important starting point to get an overall perspective of what capitalization rates are doing on a national level.

Existing Sales

In analyzing existing sales over the last couple of years, the older the transaction dates the superior the marketing conditions. In almost all cases, this outweighs some of the less important qualitative adjustments such as quality, condition, and age. As appraisers, it is more important to select more current sales outside the market than older sales within the market area.

Capitalization rates for self storage facilities have increased 100 to 150 basis points over the last 12-18 months, with typical capitalization rates ranging from 8.0% to 10%. Transactions sub 8.0% are hard to find in this economy. It seems like the days for buying a property based on a ”Pro Forma” is gone. Buyers will only look at current in place income and expenses, since this is how lenders are underwriting properties. Here is what we are see regarding capitalization rates in this market:

• Good quality / good location (8.0% – 8.5%)
• Average quality / average location (8.75% – 9.5%)
• Fair quality / poor or saturated location (10% – 12%)

Band of Investment Technique

Because most properties are purchased with debt and equity capital, the overall capitalization rate must satisfy the market return requirements of both investment positions. Lenders must anticipate receiving a competitive interest rate commensurate with the perceived risk of the investment or they will not make funds available. Lenders also require that the principal amount of the loan be repaid through period amortization payments. Similarly, equity investors must anticipate receiving a competitive equity cash return commensurate with the perceived risk or they will invest their funds elsewhere.

Effective Gross Income Multiplier Method (EGIM)

This multiplier is used as an indicator of value and takes into consideration the proportion of expense to every dollar of effective gross income. It is derived by dividing the sale price by the Effective Gross Income. Typically, effective gross income multipliers, which are derived and applied before considering expenses, are used without adjustments. The expected trend is as expense ratios increase multipliers decrease. It is common to put weight on those comparables with similar expense ratios (% of Effective gross income). The following table is a sample.

Broker/Listing

Brokers’ perspective are very important, as they have a pulse of what is going on in the area. Appraisers typically quote brokers in their reports, as well as provide several listings. Below is a sample of self storage listings currently on the market throughout the country.

The Tenant

Walgreens is a national, retail drugstore chain that sells prescription and non-prescription drugs and general merchandise. The company was founded in 1901, and as of August 2009, operated 6,996 drug stores located in 49 states and Puerto Rico. The company is publicly traded on the NASDAQ National Market, the New York Stock Exchange, and the Chicago Stock Exchange under the symbol WAG, and is included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index and the NASDAQ 100 Index. Moody’s rates Walgreens long-term debt A2 and short-term debt Prime-1. Standard & Poor’s rates Walgreens long-term debt A+ and short-term debt A-1. The outlook from both agencies is stable.

Investment Demand

There is currently strong investor demand for Walgreens properties, as market participants are attracted to the absolute net lease structure, long-term lease, moderate cash-on-cash returns and strong creditworthiness of the tenant. There was a lull in Walgreens sales during the first couple quarters of 2009 due to asking prices that were still targeting peak of the market values. Over, the past several months a majority of sellers have re-priced, which has increased sales volume substantially. Walgreens investments are attractive to a specific pool of investors to balance risk within their portfolios.

It is worth noting that the inventory of Walgreens listings is quickly evaporating, which is primarily due to recent increased sales volume and the fact that this tenant has substantially reduced expansion efforts.

Capitalization Rates

The subject property of a resent appraisal we completed was a Walgreens in Lane County, OR. The following table summarizes regional cap rates trends.

The 2008 sale transactions are no longer relevant because market cap rates shifted upward substantially since these sales occurred. The 2009 transactions indicate a cap rate range from 7.3% to 8.2%, and an average of 7.7%. Comp 1 (7.3%) is a sale that occurred in early 2009 (negotiated in 2008), and is likely a low indicator for current market cap rates. Comp 2 (8.2%) had marketability issues associated with prospective buyers having to assume existing financing that limits annual cash-on-cash to less than 1%. This issue put substantial upward pressure on the cap rate; therefore, this comp overstates prevailing cap rates. Comp 3 (7.5%) is the best indicator from this dataset given that the sale reflects current market conditions and this is a straightforward transaction.

The following table summarizes four additional cap rate examples of recent Walgreens sales in the Western region.

The additional cap rate comps show a range from 7.3% to 7.8% and average 7.5%. Based on interviews with two brokers that specialize in selling net leased investments, the most prevalent market cap rate for Walgreens is currently 7.5%, which is supported by the preceding data.

Vacancy/Concessions

Vacancy in most submarkets in the PMA has increased since the end of 2008. Most of PGP’s recent survey’s show vacancy typically in the 5-8% range for stabilized properties. Most managers are reporting that they are able to maintain reasonable occupancy, but have needed to start offering concessions, which were very uncommon in the market from 2005-late 2008.  Concessions range from waiving move-in fees to 1 month free rent (most common).

The downtown market; however, is expected to be impacted significantly more than the suburban markets due to the large amount of new supply in the market. Between January 2008 and December 2010, more than 3,000 apartment units will come on line in the downtown, or close-in east side markets. All of these units are elevator served and plan to serve the upper end of the market. However, due to the national recession, many of the potential tenants (22-30 year olds) have been hit hard by unemployment and can no longer afford to pay the rental rates that developers had planned in the $2.20 – $2.50/SF range. Absorption is in process at many of the projects with more developments to come on line in the next year. Stabilized complexes have already begun to lower rental rates dramatically and concessions are prevalent and typically include 1 month free rent and discounts, or free, garage parking. Vacancy has dramatically increased to near 8-10% in many of our recent surveys for stabilized properties. It is unclear where the downtown market rental and vacancy rates will end up, but due to the large new supply, everyone’s guess is that it will likely be below $2.00/SF and near 10% for multiple years.

Rental Rates

Similar to occupancy, rental rates are also declining in most submarkets. In suburban areas, managers are typically reporting rental rates $20 to $100/unit lower than a year ago. Managers at more luxury suburban complexes have seen the most significant decrease in rates as tenants are trying to reduce spending during the national recession and are opting to decrease rental payments when possible. Thus, where a luxury suburban complex was getting $900 – $1,000 for a 2BR/2BA unit in mid 2008, rents have typically decreased close to $100/unit and a concession of 1 month free may still be needed.

This rental rate decline is hitting the downtown market as previously discussed, but is also affecting some new suburban development. There are a few newer complexes around the suburban areas of the PMA that were originally planned as condominiums, but were converted to apartments due to the decline in the single family market. Many of these units are 1,400SF + townhouse units with attached garages, etc. The developers had expected rents close to $1.00/SF. However, the market is definitely experiencing a “rental cap”, where tenants are generally not willing to pay more than about $1,300-$1,400/unit, no matter the amenities or unit size in the suburban areas at larger apartment complexes. As these complexes lease-up, concessions of 2-3 months free have been seen, which decreases the overall economic rent. It will be interesting to see long term how these projects progress at a stabilized occupancy.

Investment Market Conditions

The current investment market conditions are very unstable in the PMA and greater Oregon area for multiple reasons: 1) decrease in investor demand for product 2) increase in capitalization rates 3) lack of available financing/ changes to underwriting requirements 4) investors who have capital are waiting on the sidelines in many cases for the market to bottom out. All of these market conditions tie together in one way or another and have led to a definite decrease in apartment values across the board. However, many sellers do not need to sell and have not been willing yet to capitulate to new market conditions

The biggest impact on property values has been from a significant increase in capitalization rates. Early in 2009, there was literally no good sales data to show what the increase was. However, recently, there have been a few sales of complexes (20+ units) that show cap rates generally 7.0+. To illustrate the dearth of sales in the first half of 2009, it is noted that in the first half of 2007, there were 60 sales of 20+ unit properties, 47 in 2008 and only 24 in 2009 according to CoStar. However, of the 24 sales, 5 of them were Section 8 properties that were purchased for LIHTC rehab and are not considered typical arms-length investment transactions. Thus, only about 19 sales have occurred during the first half of the year. Of the sales, only 2 have been 100 units or more and one of these sales was a 100 unit LIHTC property in Springfield. In regard to supply of properties for sale, LoopNet shows about 90 apartments for sale in Oregon of 20+ units as of early July. This number was about 30-50 typically during the height of the market in 2007 and early 2008.

In discussions with brokers, buyers are typically looking to purchase investment grade properties at 7.25 to 8.0% cap rates. The one closed sale of 100+ units in the PMA was in Tigard for a 1970s property and sold for a 7.6% OAR. This property would have likely been a 6.25 to 6.50% cap in 2007 or early 2008. Brokers report that most sellers are not interested in selling for 7.5% + and therefore, there is a large supply of apartments for sale on the market with little activity. Brokers have reported frustration with sellers who believe that conditions will “return to the way they were” with rates back in the 6 to 7% range. This is especially true with the less savvy sellers of smaller properties.

The reason why cap rates are unlikely to return to their historic lows is due to a significant change in underwriting loans, availability of financing, and increased risk pricing of real estate. When interest rates were 5.0-5.5% with an 80% loan to value rate with mezzanine financing available, investors saw little risk. Plus, at that time, underwriting was very lax, and often lenders used “proforma” rents, which expected 12 month rent growth. However, current underwriting and lending conditions are extremely different. First, there are very few lenders even willing to lend on apartments at this time. A few larger banks will lend at their own terms, and a few smaller banks may be willing to lend on small properties. However, for the main segment of the apartment market, the only current lenders are Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Thus, these two lenders are really driving the investment market. Currently, a 1.25 DCR is driving lending compared to a previous standard of 1.15 to 1.20. Current LTVs are 75% for refinances to 80% for acquisitions.

However, the most significant change in the process is the underwriting both by the lenders, but also by potential buyers. The lenders will only loan on current, in-place rents (sometimes lower if market rents are declining in the area), and expenses generally based on historicals. This expense standard has been significant because in the past, properties were typically sold using “proforma” expenses for some categories including R/M, turnover, on-site management, and admin. If the property had seen R/M expenses of $700/unit for the past two years, the market still expected to us a number of $400-$500/unit for a stabilized proforma. However, now, lenders are generally unwilling to do this and will place most emphasis on historical expenses. Thus, where proforma expenses would have been $3,200 for an apartment 2 years ago, expenses are now $3,600. This change in underwriting significantly lowers valuation.

When looking at investment grade deals, buyers are also being very conservative at this time due to declining market conditions. If current actual, average rents are $750, but current asking rents have declined to $700/unit, investors are typically using rents lower than the current average in their investment proformas, say $730/unit. Also, instead of the typical 5% vacancy, which was common to use in previous years, investors are projecting income in line with 6-10% vacancy/concessions/bad debt. Overall, these changes in estimating income reflect lower income levels than in 2008 as investors feel that market conditions will likely further decline before they get better. Investors are also basing their expenses on historicals, generally because this is how the loan will be underwritten by Freddie/Fannie, and the DCR depends on these estimates.

Even with the changes in financing, brokers and lenders report that there are still many buyers in the market. However, these buyers are only interested in buying properties that provide a good return, and thus, require cap rates in the 7.25+ range. One broker said that historically, a reasonable cap rate should be 100 basis points over a loan rate. With current market conditions being unstable, it is reasonable to assume that this 100 basis point, or higher estimate, is reasonable. Thus, if current rates at 6 to 6.25%, then cap rates should be 7.25% or higher for most properties. Overall, due to the lack of sales, the market seems to be supporting this theory.

Summary

Overall, apartment market conditions in the PMA are declining with lower rents, rising vacancy, and increased use of concessions. This will likely continue into the next 6-18 months, or until the economy regains strength and jobs are created and tenant spending confidence strengthens. Sales of apartments will also continue to be much lower than typical until owners either need to sell for financial reasons (upside down loan coming due, etc), or until owners realize that cap rates in the 5-6% range will not be seen again anytime soon due to the changes in financing, underwriting, and buyer expectations.

PGP Valuation has been serving the Portland Metro Area and Greater Oregon for the past 30 years. We have the largest real estate appraisal and consulting firm in Oregon and serve all property types including Industrial, Office, Retail, Apartment, and Land. Feel free to call the office to speak with an industry expert for any real estate consulting or appraisal needs.

Jeremy Snow, MAI is the Multi-Family team leader in the Portland office.  His team completes more investment grade apartment appraisals in Oregon than any firm.  Jeremy also has a specialty in restricted rent apartments (LIHTC, Section 8, and RD) and has completed these appraisals all over the State of Oregon.  Feel free to contact Jeremy for investment grade apartment questions or for your appraisal/consulting needs throughout the State of Oregon.

The impact of the recession and financial crisis on commercial real estate has been widely reported. With securitized lending out of the picture and banks less able to lend, purchase financing has been more difficult to obtain and available in smaller quantities. This has led to a slowdown in sale transactions for commercial real estate. To compare how convenience stores have fared, the chart below shows the trend in volume of transactions for west coast convenience stores and service stations as reported by CoStar Group Inc.

Sales volume reached their peak during late 2007 and early 2008 as a number of oil companies rapidly liquidated stores. By mid 2008, however, lenders had begun to pull back, and rapidly increasing fuel prices made operators’ margins difficult to predict. Property transactions fell precipitously, and at the height of the credit freeze sales were off more than 50% (3^rd quarter 2008 vs. same quarter 2007). Sales have rebounded slightly since then, but 2009 is still on pace to lag 2008 by 26%. During the period, many oil companies were in the process of liquidating portfolios of stores, which has not only cushioned the fall in transaction volume, but also contributed to the peak sales volume in 2007/2008. Additionally, CoStar Group Inc. has expanded its geographic coverage over time, so these figures may understate the decline in volume.

Although the majority of convenience store sales involve owner-operators, price trends have correlated strongly with the real estate investment markets. Just as capitalization rates peaked for many property types in 2006, data show median prices peaked for c-stores at roughly the same time. The chart shoes median and quartile prices for west coast c-stores and service stations.

Following rapid price appreciation of 31% in 2005 and 18% in 2006, median c-store prices have fallen for three straight years. Nevertheless, the fall has been muted, amounting to a decline of 16% since 2006.

Note that the lower quartile prices have held relatively steady while upper quartile prices have fallen the most. This is likely and indication that few owners of high-quality stores are willing to sell in a distressed market

In conclusion, data indicate that c-store values are falling. However, the decline appears to be less of a sudden correction than a gradual adjustment ongoing since 2006. Anecdotally, many owner-operators have found purchase financing difficult to find. Undoubtedly, this has hurt transaction volumes, but pricing has held up fairly well considering the pressure mounting on other sectors of retail.

The last couple of years have represented a time in which markets stagnated, not solely due to the lack of available capital, but also due to the gap in expectations between buyers and sellers.  Sellers clung to memories of historically low capitalization rates and aggressive rent projections, while buyers assumed the worst in their cash flow analysis and disregarded cap rates altogether.  The chasm between buyer and seller over the last couple of years has been wide, to the point of stunting almost all activity in the market.  The result of the stagnation is that market values are relatively vague across most property types.

Most industry experts concur – the commercial real estate market trails residential and is affected by all the additional market conditions in play. When combined with the still-compounding effects of stock market fluctuations, increasing unemployment, decreased consumer spending (related impacts to retail sales and more), and ongoing corporate restructuring and downsizing to adjust to the greater cycle, conditions are likely to worsen in the short- to medium-term. Key markets such as New York are just beginning to feel the impacts of financial sector lay-offs with commercial space inventories dramatically increasing and residential foreclosures accelerating. These key markets set trends across other areas of the nation.

In addition, as financial institutions continue to flounder or be seized by the FDIC, related asset workouts are the growing trends. In the past, the FDIC would typically take over one bank in a time span covering years. In 2009, as reported on CBS’s 60 Minutes, the FDIC has seized over 50 banks to date and the number is growing. Sitting on the books of these failed financial institutions are portfolios of properties that must be immediately appraised for true, current value and factored against the market conditions in order to get them sold. A related increase of property sales to liquidate these assets, both previously foreclosed properties and those in active loan management, will have direct, negative impacts on the market through further increases in inventories and the liquidation of assets at drastically reduced prices to facilitate rapid disposition and cash flow.

With all of these factors in play, expect market participants in the future to be more realistic in their internal underwriting, but to place emphasis on initial cash-on-cash returns and a flight to quality.  Well-located and tenanted product will slowly begin to move again as the expectations between buyers and sellers move toward each other. However, the flight to quality will benefit the some markets sooner than other areas of the U.S.

The day of reckoning has long passed its arrival industry wide; the time to take charge of our future is now. Our challenge is three fold: how do we forget everything we have learned; yet, exploit all of the skills we have accumulated from years of experience; and, give up our mental memory of the future? We as real estate practitioners need to take charge, we need to build, we need to buy, we need to invest; so, we need to ask ourselves: What will it take to get back into the game? How we will stay relevant until that time for each of us arrives?

Real estate as an asset class always was a worthwhile investment for three reasons: we were led to believe that it was a hedge against inflation; it was an asset that you could buy with leverage; and, that the combination of safe leverage and rental increases were in some way driven by the existence of job growth across our economy.  In Q1 2009 the economy lost 1.9 million jobs and unemployment currently sits at 8.5%. Since 1939, our job growth over any 120 consecutive reporting months-a decade-has always been in excess of 12%. In January of 2010, we will acknowledge our own “lost decade” as there will be no effective job growth between January 2000 and January 2010. During the same time, we have added 13%-14% new office stock across the U.S. market place. This is clearly not good for the asset class.

Economists believe that unemployment will crest by the end of 2010. If history repeats itself, in 1986 and 1987 we had a valuation peak followed by financial crisis, followed by a political solution to the economic collapse. It wasn’t until 1994-eight years later-that the marketplace truly settled and began to grow. During 2006 and 2007 we had a valuation peak followed by extraordinary financial collapse and a political solution to this economic strife. If history repeats itself, we’re not back to a stabilized marketplace until 2014.

Accelerating or retarding the speed of recovery is the reality of a synchronized global recession. We have complications associated with a forecast of job loss or valuation loss due to the world’s increasingly interwoven economies and financial systems. As globalization speeds the flow of economic benefits in good times, in times of contraction, globalization transmits trouble with enormous speed and force affecting economies all over the world. Our economy shrank at a 6.3% pace at the end of 2008 which was the worst showing in more than a quarter of a century.

Unemployment rises, home values fall, and investment portfolios shrink so consumers cut back forcing companies to slash production and jobs. The U.S. consumer is 70% of U.S. GDP; the U.S. represents about 1/3 of the world’s GDP; therefore, the U.S. consumer is 20% of the world’s GDP. At the same time, we face growing protectionism sentiments across the globe verses our collective need to stay synchronized globally to get out of this recession. How do we get through the global recession that sees a great decrease in demand for all products let alone real estate space? When we emerge from recession to recovery, how do we have a sustainable path that makes good business decisions not just for one year, but for many years to come? If real estate is a “location” business, where is your business positioned to exploit the opportunities that 2009 and 2010 will bring forth?

A long period of healthy economic growth convinces people to take bigger and bigger risks. In the fall of 2008 former Chairman Greenspan insisted that the precipitating factor of the 2008 crisis was the failure to properly price risky assets. As you consider your play in this real estate cycle, consider your capacity to evaluate, analyze, identify, assess and price risk. You must consider the partners who have provided equity capital to your individual business plans as well. Without goal congruence as it relates to evaluation, analysis, identification, assessment and ultimate price of risk, the proverbial rug is likely to get pulled out from under your business plan. It’s bad enough that we stand on shifting sands vis-à-vis the regulatory ground rules that our government seems to be placing upon us. As we stabilize housing, fix the banking system, get credit flowing and re-regulate the financial markets-remember that hope and fear are inseparable. We need to ensure that those who provide the equity for America’s deleveraging are in sync with the real estate owners and operators as to how they identify, assess and price risk. We believe that investors like risk (volatility of outcome) so long as they can price it; but, what investors hate is uncertainty-not knowing how big a risk is. Markets buy and sell risk that is wanted and unwanted.

Real estate is about risk shift and the market place is where this shift (for price) takes place. Today however, capital “markets” seem to be an oxymoron. We don’t see capital flows returning to the levels we experienced in 2007. The combination of devaluation of assets, lower loan-to-value (LTVs) and decreasing velocity of transactional turnover should cover all but about $50-$70 billion of the capital needs of our industry. We don’t see securitized mortgage lending returning until there is stability in the interpretation of mark-to-market valuation as well as sale treatment by the accountants on the balance sheets of our financial institutions. Pricing of course will be critical for the “new securitized world” given the volatility (risk that must be priced) heretofore bond buyers have experienced since June of 2007. 

Today, the market doesn’t know what to expect. There is regulation uncertainty and there is a fear that regulation will change, leaving us regulation by deal. Can and will the government change the rules on the business community whimsically?

Money supply’s effectiveness depends on how quickly people spend it-that is called velocity. If people horde cash, velocity falls and more money is required to keep the economy moving. As velocity continues to fall faster than the Fed can pump up the money supply, our government must spend on goods and services. Yet Congress does not have its own stash. Every dollar it injects into our economy is taxed or borrowed out of the economy. Our economy has stalled, with insufficient aggregate demand, with a decline in demand for goods and services, sales fall. Production is cut, people are laid-off, unemployment rises and declining profits further depress demand creating a vicious circle. We have to increase demand through consumption, investment, net exports and government purchases. Cheap credit, the usual route to recovery has failed to work. Lenders have pulled back; borrowers are focused more on paying down debt and building up savings. Keynesian economists advocate increasing government spending to combat economic downturns and generate jobs.  

Motivations matter. Banks, whether they are local, regional or national interpret “troubled assets” and the use of TARP or PPIP money differently. “Toxic” to a local bank may be acquisition, development and construction loans for home builders while “toxic” for the largest banks in the globe may be mortgage securities. The motivations of banks differ from life companies (regulated by 50 different state regulators) which are different than the motivations of a securitized lender (and whether we are dealing with a trustee, a master, a primary, a sub, or a special servicer). In this market place knowledge matters, motivation matters, relationships matter.

Our future gets clearer every day. If our crisis was caused by a dramatic under pricing of risk, resulting from a combination of endless supply of capital and an insatiable appetite for leverage; then, our future is one of lower leverage, greater transparency, greater regulation and an organized marketplace where transactions are done responsibly. Regulation has the tendency to create accounting rules and capital requirements that aggravate financial retrenchment during a slowdown and financial access in a boom.

All real estate makes money; the only question is who owns it at the time.

Ariticle written by Jack M. Cohen, CRI, CMB, Chief Executive Officer of Cohen Financial

Download PDF article here

The dislocation in the commercial real estate capital markets that exists today in the second quarter of 2009 has frustrated users of capital and left them feeling hopeless. The small universe of debt and equity providers that are willing and able to provide capital today want to advance less loan dollars on your deal while also taking on less risk. Most of the time that means that it’s a deal you cannot make.  Thankfully, after successive quarters of bad news, most of us are past the denial stage and are making attempts to exist in a broken market.  The leverage being offered by capital providers today would make sense if cap rates were closer to double digits, but unless and until that market correction happens, there will be further frustrations as both borrowers and lenders are fighting to preserve their equity and maintain returns seen earlier in the decade.  The following are some survival tips that could help your deal:

1.    Focus on the borrower/sponsor.  If you haven’t already, organize all personal financial information into a well presented document that clearly lists all assets & liabilities as well as a schedule of real estate owned that includes mortgage data. Also include a resume with past projects that demonstrate you have the appropriate experience necessary to perform on the subject business plan. Borrower’s are being scrutinized much more today than during the last boom. Give the lender every reason to promote your deal up the food chain.

2.    Focus on operations. If vacancy is up in your submarket, make sure you have a documented plan for tenant retention & expense management. Include your managers and leasing brokers on every aspect of the plan that is appropriate.  A solid business plan will illustrate to a potential lender that you have your head in the game and make you someone they want to lend to.

3.    Reduce risk wherever possible. A development deal may need to move forward because of a pending land loan maturity.  Attracting a development loan will be difficult, but may be possible if you reduce risk by attempting to presale your development, in whole or in part, to a serious buyer who is willing to make a sizeable earnest money deposit. This could add a credit enhancement to your deal by showing the lender they have an exit with some teeth in it.

4.    Consider smaller investments (loans < $5 Million). The majority of debt providers who are in the market right now are making loans under this amount, thus increasing your chances.

5.    Partner up. A new equity partner, whether a local operator, a high net worth individual, or an institution, can provide additional loan guarantees on a new loan and could infuse cash into a lagging project that is facing a loan maturity. You dilute your ownership position, but you could save your investment and you may find a partner who will complement your weaknesses in areas such as cash, operations, local expertise, etc. 

6.    Adjust expectations for returns. The 55-60% loan to values we live with now vs. the 80%+ values we saw often during the last boom are requiring investors to use more of their cash to get into investments which puts downward pressure on leveraged returns. 

7.    Hire reputable CRE finance professionals. Ask around and commit to hiring a mortgage broker who you trust or comes recommended by someone you trust. It’s essential to exclusively engage a mortgage broker early in the process that will be accountable to you and the transaction. A mortgage banker plays a dual role by uncovering investments for the lender while sourcing the appropriate solution for the borrower. Look for brokers who receive their compensation from the borrower and not the lender.  It’s important to the deals success to have one professional as the single point of contact who is your advocate in the capital markets, much like you would have one listing agent. 

8.    Explore underlying loan assumptions & seller financing.  According to Real Capital Analytics April Issue of Capital Trends, more than 50% of deals being done right are being capitalized with assumable debt and/or seller financing.  This can be a good source of capital for someone who must transact because of a 1031 exchange deadline.

PGP Valuation and Colliers International have been able to keep pace with the changing market. Through our national platform of real estate appraisers and brokers, we are able bridge the gap between historical data and emerging trends.

There is uncertainty in the market from all sides. Buyers, sellers, owners, borrowers, lenders, brokers and appraisers continue to look at current and past events to project how the real estate markets will react in 2009. Below is summary of key factors that will impact the valuation of real estate in 2009:

Transaction Volume

There are simply fewer deals being done in the market at this time. Sales volume is off 50% to 75% in the major commercial brokerage companies. According to Real Capital Analytic’s quarter in review (Oct. 2008) sales volume is down 54% in term of total dollars and 50% in number of transactions between 2007 and 2008. However, much of this volume occurred in the first half of 2008 and year end number are anticipated to be further off – a trend that will likely continue into the first quarter of 2009. With fewer investment grade industrial properties on the market and limited recent sales to track value trends, market participants are uncertain in relation to key statistics such as capitalization rates and discount rates.

Financial Markets

There continues to be turmoil in the financial markets. Despite the recent government bailout program there is a lack of liquidity in the market. This makes financing large, institutional assets more difficult and resulted in as much as 50% of deals being done in market including assumed debt.

Leverage has changed dramatically. Highly leveraged deals with low interest rates and abundant capital fueled capitalization rate compression through 2007. With many lenders on the sidelines, lower LTV’s, and higher interest equity yields will play a larger part in pricing.

Impact on Capitalization Rates

There are two major issues to address on capitalization rates for institutional industrial investments: 1) financing, and 2) cash flow assumptions.

Financing

First, the lack of capital will continue to be a fundamental problem in the market. For those deals that can be financed, the terms are substantially different than in the recent past. Lower LTV’s, higher interest rates, shorter loan amortizations, and higher equity return requirements will result in higher capitalization rates.

Below are three scenarios. The first scenario is typical of a leveraged deal in 2007.

The next scenario shows how in 2008 loan terms have changed. By increasing the interest rate by 75 basis points, dropping the LTV from 70% to 65%, and decreasing the amortization period from 30 years to 25 years, the OAR increases by 40 basis points.

The concern in term of capitalization rates is that if equity requirements for near term cash flow increase (because there is less upside in value increase and rent growth) then the impact on capitalization rates will be higher.

Capitalization rates have seen unprecedented compression in recent years. This is due to greater leverage and more emphasis on future increases in value or cash flow. These two components have been significantly altered in today’s environment.

Cash Flow Assumptions

Many investment grade industrial properties are purchased based on a cash flow model. The most common is using Argus software to project a 5 or 10-year holding period.

If we hold discount rates and terminal cap rates level, there is still upward pressure on capitalization rates due to more conservative projection being made in today’s environment versus a year ago.

The Impact of Cash Flow Assumptions on Cap Rates chart is a case study analyzing a fully occupied 400,000+ SF distribution building with long-term NNN tenants using Argus software. Typical assumption for 2007, 2008, and a third scenario in which yield rate requirements go up are presented.

As the chart above demonstrates between the 2007 and 2007 columns, slight changes in cash flow assumptions have a significant impact on the capitalization rate. The impact would be greater if this property in case study did not have relatively long-term tenants.

It is apparent that the market is much more conservative on leasing assumptions and rental rate growth. The biggest question for 2009 is where yield rates (discount rate) will land.

The question of yield rates is difficult to quantify due to many major buyers being on the sidelines or unable to purchase assets at this time. The lack of financing and lower stock values have played a large role. With fewer buyers available, the remaining buyers should have opportunities to purchase assets with slightly higher yields that what they could have purchased in recent years.

In summary, the impact of financing, more conservative cash flow assumptions, and buyer’s able to achieve higher yield rates will push capitalization rates down through year end 2008 and into 2009. Many institutional investors are looking at discount rates from 8.00% to 10.00%, with most in the 8.50% to 9.50% range.

Capitalization Rate Survey

The previous analysis explains some of the why. The survey below is provided by Colliers International. It tracks capitalization rate trends from major industrial markets in the US.

What this means to Distribution/Warehouse Real Estate

In 2009, cash will continue to be king. There will be continued demand for good quality, stable, investment grade industrial products. However, pricing will be a contentious point between buyers and sellers. Many owners of good quality portfolios may hold their assets until some of the uncertainty subsides. Those products most impacted will be value added deals. One-off investments will continue to be in demand; however, there may be limited financing available in the short term for portfolio transactions.

One positive for industrial real estate is that its construction cycle is shorter than other product types. The market is therefore more responsive to soft demand and less likely to see oversupply. This diminishes risk for investors associated with rental rate decline or vacancy problems.

Contact for PGP Valuation’s Industrial Practice Group

If you have questions on valuation trends, please contact me:

Jeff L. Grose, MAI

Portland Executive Managing Director

Industrial Market Reports

  2009 PGP Industrial Market Watch (Puget Sound Area - Washington)

  2009 PGP Industrial Forecast (Portland)

  2009 1st Quarter - Industrial Market Report (Sacramento)